An Analysis of the Impact of Trump’s US Election Victory in the Middle East

Introduction 

On 6 November 2024, former president and Republican candidate Donald Trump was re-elected to office in the US after defeating Democrat Kamala Harris with 312 Electoral College votesⁱ. This was in contrast to Harris’ 226 electoral college votes, meaning that Trump will return to office from January 2025 alongside vice president elect, JD Vance. The Republicans also gained a majority in the Senate for the first time in four yearsⁱⁱ and took control of the House of Representativesⁱⁱⁱ. Trump’s win has been widely reported as a huge political comeback and will have a significant impact upon multiple regions across the globe. 

In his campaign, Trump often made broad policy pledges which lacked specific details but were based upon beliefs of non-intervention and trade protectionism. This is more commonly known as the America First policy^iv, which indicates Trump’s preference for the US to have a greater level of isolation from other nations. Despite this, Trump’s win will have a global impact and indicates a significant shift in how the US will approach foreign affairs. This will likely be seen most considerably in regions which are experiencing crises. Trump’s unpredictability will likely raise some concerns from global leaders surrounding issues like national security. However, his allies have often positioned this as a diplomatic asset, though it remains to be seen if it is effective during his second presidential term. This report will specifically focus on the reaction to Trump’s victory in the Middle East, analysing the impact of the election result against the region. 

During his first presidency, Trump took a bold and controversial approach to the Middle East. For example, he recognised Jerusalem as the capital of Israel instead of Tel Aviv^v, abandoned an international nuclear deal with Iran^vi, and helped establish diplomatic relations for Arab nations with Israel^vii. These actions in the Middle East were often undertaken in a transactional nature, as Trump leveraged the international power the US once held in the region. This approach often garnered international criticism. More broadly, Trump and his family deepened their ties with the Middle East through other deals, with Saudi Arabia reportedly investing $2 billion into Affinity Partners. This is a private equity firm run by Trump’s son-in-law Jared Kushner^viii. Trump has made several statements saying that he wants to stop the war in Gaza, though he has positioned himself as a longtime ally of Israel^ix. Though Trump’s relationship with Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu has at times been complex^x, the two will likely continue to have a warm relationship during his second presidency. 

Trump is likely to have a significant impact upon the region, though whether this combats the now weakened position of the US in the Middle East is a long-term impact which remains to be assessed. 

Oil and Gas 

In the appointment of his government, Trump has named oil and gas executive Chris Wright as head of the US energy department. This appointment came after Trump pledged to “drill, baby, drill”^xi at the Republican convention in July 2024. Wright is the founder and CEO of Energy Liberty, a fracking company, and described the term climate crisis as “deceptive” and “destructive” in a video posted to his LinkedIn account in 2023. In a statement, Trump reportedly wrote that Wright is “one of the pioneers who helped launch the American Shale Revolution that fuelled American Energy Independence, and transformed the Global Energy Markets and Geopolitics”^xii. In addition to his role as head of US energy, Wright will be appointed to a new Council of National Energy, which will coordinate the path to US energy dominance. This government appointee is widely seen as a positive for the fossil fuel industry and has reportedly been welcomed in the Middle East, with an anonymous Saudi Arabian government official reportedly saying to S&P Global that Wright’s appointment is “fantastic”^xiii. As Wright takes on the role, it should be expected that he will defend the use of fossil fuels and will extend oil and gas production to keep up with demand in the US. Whilst Wright may not specifically focus on Middle Eastern producers of oil and gas, this will present the opportunity for organisations based in the region to invest in the US. Additionally, Wright’s belief that fossil fuels are a key part of energy will likely bring optimism from those based in the industry. As such, Middle Eastern producers of oil and gas may be more willing to work with industry experts who are based in the US as Trump’s administration begins to implement legislation. 

This demonstrates the varied attitude that the Middle East has towards oil and gas, though it is likely that states which are pro-fossil fuels will be optimistic that the US will become aligned in continuing its use. However, if the US were to increase its own oil production under the Trump administration, then it could complicate the goal of the OPEC alliance to raise its own output without causing prices to significantly lower^xiv. OPEC stands for the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, and enables cooperation between oil-producing and oil-dependent regions. 

On 27 November 2024, oil prices reportedly increased due to a demand surge in the US^xv. This came as the US dollar index weakened and a ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah was agreed. The ceasefire deal likely alleviated some concerns about supply in the market and the prices increased as a result. As Figure 1 shows, the American Petroleum Institute (API) reported^xvi a decrease of 5.93 million barrels in US commercial crude inventories. This will likely continue to impact the rising demand in the US, once again creating optimism amongst those related to the industry in the Middle East. This was bolstered by the weaker value of the US dollar, which makes oil cheaper when bought in other currencies. It can be expected that demand will increase further if this continues. 

It has been reported that the ceasefire could place pressure on crude oil prices, as the US could reduce sanctions on countries like Iran, which backs Hezbollah^xvii. However, as this occurred under the Biden administration, it remains to be seen whether Trump imposes any future sanctions on countries like Iran. Any sanctions could have an effect on the oil market, potentially meaning there will be supply disruption in the long-term. As such, there could be further instability in oil which correlates with the actions of Trump when he takes office. 

Netanyahu’s arrest warrant 

On 21 November 2024, the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued arrest warrants for Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu, former defence minister Yoav Gallant, and military commander of Hamas, Mohammed Deif^xviii. It is of note that Israel’s army claimed to have killed Mohammed Deif in an air raid in southern Gaza on 13 July 2024^xix, though Hamas has never confirmed his death. The ICC judges reportedly stated that there are reasonable grounds that the men bore criminal responsibility for alleged crimes against humanity and war crimes during the ongoing Israel-Hamas war. In response to the arrest warrant, Netanyahu denounced the decision as antisemitic^xx. The ICC’s warrant reportedly marks the first time that leaders of a democracy and a state aligned with the West have been charged by the court^xxi. Both Israeli and US politicians have condemned the arrest warrant, something which is expected due to their long standing allyship. According to spokeswoman Karine Jean-Pierre, the Biden administration “fundamentally rejects the court’s decision to issue arrest warrants for senior Israeli officials” as the ICC does not have “jurisdiction in this matter”^xxii. The impact of the warrant will largely depend on whether the ICC’s 24 member states will enforce the ruling, though this will exclude Israel and the US because they are not part of the court. The ICC has contradicted the US’ statement that it does not have jurisdiction by highlighting that the UN’s secretary general recognised Palestine as a member state in 2021^xxiii. As such, it is likely that the ICC will continue to monitor the crisis in the occupied West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem to the opposition of the US. As Trump previously criticised the ICC in his first presidency, it should be expected that he will act against it to illustrate the US’ support of Israel. 

Whilst the outgoing Democrat administration has rebuked the ICC, Republicans and politicians who will form part of Trump’s government have demanded that sanctions are brought against the court. Figure 2 depicts a post from incoming Senate leader and Republican John Thune threatening US sanctions against the ICC. Thune urges current Senate leader and Democrat Chuck Schumer to immediately pass sanctions, stating that the Republican majority will stand with Israel and make supportive legislation a priority in Congress under Trump. In June 2024, US lawmakers passed legislation which aimed to sanction the efforts of ICC prosecutors to seek arrest warrants for top Israeli officials^xxiv, enacting the Illegitimate Court Counteraction Act. The bill bars US entry and restricts any US-based property transactions for ICC officials involved in the request for arrest warrants, though at the time this was largely seen as a symbolic vote. However, now that Trump is returning to office, it is likely that harsher restrictions will be placed on the ICC in the future. 

As the Biden administration removed sanctions enacted by Trump against ICC officials in 2021^xxv, it may be that the new government attempts to quickly reinstate these. The response from other Republicans may also indicate this, as seen in Figure 3. These statements will likely be the start of the Republican’s attempt to undermine the legitimacy of the ICC, placing barriers through US legislation to make it increasingly harder for it to operate. 

Waltz, who is Trump’s incoming security advisor, echoes the language Thune used in his post. This demonstrates how the negative sentiment against the ICC is found across Trump’s incoming administration. Consequently, this serves as a warning to the ICC that the Trump administration will be active in its targeting of the court and defence of Israel. This is further evidenced by vice president elect JD Vance’s statement on the anniversary of 7 October that “stronger and smarter”^xxvi US leadership is needed to support Israel. 

More widely in Israel’s engagement with conflict, the US will likely remain a staunch ally under Trump. The Washington Post recently reported that a close aide to Netanyahu told Trump and his son-in-law Jared Kushner that Israel was advancing a ceasefire deal in Lebanon, with the aim of bringing an early foreign policy win to the incoming president^xxvii. This illustrates how Israel has no loyalty to the current Biden administration but also sees the opportunity for Trump to help advance its goals. This was successfully achieved, as Biden announced that a ceasefire had been agreed between Israel and Iran-backed Hezbollah on 26 November 2024^xxviii. The ceasefire came 13 months after the conflict began in Lebanon. In early December 2024, Israel conducted air strikes against Lebanon and Hezbollah conducted a mortar attack^xxix despite the agreement being in place. This demonstrates the fragile state of the ceasefire, raising concerns that it could collapse. The agreement states that Lebanese Armed Forces will be deployed to southern Lebanon within 60 days, as Israel gradually withdraws its remaining forces^xxx. Both the US and France will monitor the implementation of the deal, with Joe Biden stating that Israel “retains the right to self defence consistent with international law”. However, this also demonstrates how there was only so much Israel could conduct for its operation in Lebanon before it became a state-on-state conflict. This is something that Israel nor Hezbollah had the resources for, as demonstrated by Israel’s attempt to draft men from the Haredi community. It is of note that this was previously considered a taboo in the country. Since the Supreme Court ruled in June 2024 that ultra-Orthodox Jewish men could no longer be exempt from military service, more than 1,000 arrest warrants have been issued for draft avoiders from the community^xxxi. This ruling caused tension between the community and the state, demonstrating how dwindling Israeli resources have created a volatile political scene. As such, this ceasefire is both convenient for Netanyahu and bolsters the appearance of Trump’s power before he takes office. The US’ relations with Israel may stabilise because of this, though it is likely to remain strained whilst Biden finishes his remaining term. 

Biden’s government reportedly kept Trump’s incoming administration closely aware of its efforts to broker the ceasefire deal between Israel and Hezbollah^xxxii. As Figure 4 shows, members of Trump’s upcoming government claimed credit for the deal. 

Trump’s senior national security team was reportedly briefed by the Biden administration as negotiations were conducted. However, the Republicans were not directly involved in the talks. Waltz’s post forefronts Iranian involvement, as it would have had to approve of Hezbollah’s agreement to the ceasefire. The combination of Israel’s military activity and Trump’s re-election may see Iran re-organise in the period between November 2024 and January 2025 when he takes office. It is likely that there will be some concerns from Iran about how Trump will respond to the state during his second term. Additionally, this ceasefire demonstrates how Netanyahu has fulfilled his promise to Trump to bring an early foreign policy win. It may be that because a ceasefire has been agreed in Lebanon that Trump strong arms Netanyahu into stopping military activity in Gaza. This would promote the image of Trump as a peacemaker, though it could prove difficult given the problematic nature of the conflict in Gaza and Israel’s willingness to leverage the US’ weakened position in the Middle East. 

The ceasefire also indicates the significant damage which Hezbollah’s infrastructure took in its fight against Israel. As the group is weakened, other political parties in Lebanon may see this as an opportunity to limit the influence of Hezbollah in the region. It is likely that this development will see Israel turn its focus directly to Iran and Gaza, particularly the northern region which is already occupied by its forces. This ceasefire provides the opportunity for Israel to recuperate its resources and apply pressure onto Hamas, potentially meaning that it will finally reach its long-stated goal of regaining Israeli hostages.  

Additionally, Figure 5 shows a post from Trump’s Truth Social account which states there “will be hell to pay” if the hostages in Gaza are not released. 

This indicates that Trump will push for a ceasefire between Israel and Hamas before he takes office in January 2025. However, the post offers no details about how Trump would achieve this and is ambiguous on whether the US military would become directly involved. Conversely, it does indicate how Trump’s Middle East policy will differ from his first presidency. It highlights that Trump will escalate the situation if a ceasefire is not achieved, suggesting that his methods to bring about peace may not follow usual conventions. The post reportedly came hours after the death of Omer Neutra, a dual US-Israel citizen who was taken hostage by Hamas^xxxiii, was confirmed by the IDF. This is one of the most direct calls taken by Trump to demand a ceasefire, indicating his willingness to enact consequences if a deal is not made. 

In the wake of Trump’s re-election, Israeli finance minister Bezalel Smotrich stated that he believes the country could work with the incoming Trump administration to promote the annexation of the West Bank^xxxiv. If successful in annexing the West Bank, Israel could take control over a portion of the territory, or it could prevent the evacuation of existing Israeli settlements. These settlements are currently illegal under international law^xxxv. Trump has chosen Mike Huckabee to serve as the next ambassador to Israel, something which the country will favourably look upon as the governor has long rejected the two-state solution and Palestine as a territory^xxxvi. As such, Trump’s choice for government could undermine his image as a mediator in conflicts. This is because many will see these government officials as rigidly in favour of Israel. As a consequence, this could prolong hostilities and, for example, delay the Saudi-Israel normalisation pact. This pact is currently viewed as a significant step in achieving wider peace in the region. Whilst Trump has been vocal in his opinion that a two-state solution will not work, which abandons the current US foreign policy line, he is reportedly opposed to Israel’s plans to annex the West Bank^xxxvii. This move is likely seen by Trump as a strategy which would worsen Israel’s international standing, though his opposition to annexation reportedly came from unnamed sources. As such, this has increased speculation around the issue, but does point to the likelihood that Trump will support further Israeli military activity only if it takes place outside of Gaza. Subsequently, this conflict will remain a contentious point for the Republican as he settles into his second term.  

Nevertheless, if Trump continues to use a narrative of Israeli defence, then it is likely that he will solidify his support further in certain US demographics. This could particularly be observed for Christian voters in southern states of the US, including Evangelicals who staunchly support Israel. This support comes from the belief that Jewish people are God’s people in evangelicalism^xxxviii. As such, this is a key voter group which Trump will likely want to continue appealing to as the Israel-Hamas conflict continues. 

Arab States and the Abraham Accords 

On 20 October 2024, Trump gave an interview with Saudi Arabia’s state-owned television network Al Arabiya and stated that he was “truly confident” that “lasting peace”^xxxix could be achieved in the Middle East if he was elected. Additionally, Trump expressed his desire to expand the Abraham Accords as a priority if elected to office. The Abraham Accords are a series of agreements which aim to normalise relations between Israel and several Arab states^xl. They were originally negotiated in Trump’s first presidency by senior advisor Jared Kushner and Middle East envoy Avi Berkowitz, with Israel, the UAE, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan signing it. Currently, Arab states fall into two categories, namely those who have signed the Abraham accords and those who have not, such as Kuwait and Qatar. In the first instance, Saudi Arabia and countries who have signed the Abraham Accords will likely view Trump’s election favourably. This is because Trump will be viewed as a stronger leader in comparison to Biden, with the incoming president more likely to work in the interest of the region. 

However, it is probable that Trump will only be able to negotiate Saudi Arabia’s signature on the Abraham Accords on the contingency that a Palestinian state is created^xli. This is particularly evident as Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has explicitly stated that the kingdom will not cease in its efforts for this to be achieved. It is likely that Arab states will look to Saudi Arabia more widely to use its relationship with Trump to monitor his Middle Eastern policies. During Trump’s first term, Saudi Arabia embraced the transactional nature of its relationship with the Republican. As such, it is expected that the country will leverage this once again if Trump wants to succeed in expanding the Abraham Accords. However, it remains to be seen whether Trump will be able to balance US relations with states like Saudi Arabia when it adopts a staunch pro-Israel stance. The hardline support for Israel by some of Trump’s government may become a point of tension when working with Arab states in the Middle East. 

In contrast, states such as Kuwait and Qatar will likely keep ties cordial with Trump but will be hesitant to progress relations further. For Qatar in particular, it may be that the state distances itself away from Trump given his previous comments in 2017 that it was a “funder of terror” ^xlii. However, the state is now less politically isolated in comparison to when Trump first came to power. As such, Qatar may look to emphasise its importance in the region so that Trump does not downplay its status in the wider Middle East. Qatar may achieve this via its status as a major non-NATO ally, which is something Trump may use to the US’ advantage. For example, Qatar’s role in mediation efforts for multiple conflicts, including the Israel-Hamas war^xliii, means that it could be viewed as an extension to Trump and more broadly the US’ image as a peacemaker. Qatar is also host to one of the US’ most important military bases in the region, with both countries agreeing to extend American military presence in the Al Udeid Air Base in January 2024^xliv. This base provides the US with a critical platform in the Middle East, demonstrating how it relies upon the region and how Trump will not be able to disengage from countries like Qatar completely. Interestingly, Trump’s pick for attorney general, Pam Bondi, was previously a lobbyist for a Republican firm where she represented major organisations and foreign governments, including Qatar^xlv. Whilst no longer active, Bondi was registered as a foreign agent for the Qatari government. This historical link may be something that Trump leverages in his second turn, with Bondi’s experience with Qatar used to improve relations as an indication that he recognises the country’s regional importance. 

Whilst Arab leaders may have once welcomed Trump’s aggressive stance on Iran, this is not as likely to be favoured during his second term. Since Trump’s first presidency, Arab states have modified their foreign policies^xlvi, favouring limited military intervention and reinforcing relations with countries where tensions previously lay. This is particularly evident in China’s brokering of a deal between Saudi Arabia and Iran, with the two countries agreeing to reestablish diplomatic relations in 2023^xlvii. The change came amid increasing scepticism over the US’ role in the Middle East between Trump’s first term and the tenure of Joe Biden. Iran itself will view Trump’s win very cautiously, with the country likely to receive an increased amount of scrutiny from the US in the long-term. In Trump’s first term, US relations with Iran severely soured after the country launched an air strike in Iraq which killed Iranian military commander, Gen Qasem Soleimani^xlviii. Figure 6 details Trump’s response to the airstrike, with Soleimani’s death marking a major escalation in tensions between Washington and Tehran.  

Tension also arose between the two countries in 2018, when Trump declared that the US was withdrawing from the Iran nuclear deal^xlix. This move was followed by the US imposing sanctions against Iran, consequently weakening the country’s economy. In the months before the US election, Trump stated that he would be open to talks with Iran on a new version of the nuclear agreement. However, this was likely motivated by the threat Iran poses in its pursuit of nuclear weapons^l. This is a notable development given Trump’s previous hostility towards Iran, potentially implying that the Republican will take a different approach with the country in his second term. Trump clearly understands the implication of the US withdrawing from the nuclear deal in 2018, as Iran has stocks of enriched uranium^li which could threaten to raise an arms race in the Middle East. However, during the election campaign, accusations were raised that Iran had been plotting to assassinate Trump. Additionally, a grand jury also indicted multiple Iranians on charges related to the hacking of the Trump presidential campaign^lii. These incidents may pose barriers to renewing talks between the US and Iran, as they remain points of contention for the two countries. 

It is likely that Trump will attempt to contain Iran’s influence in the Middle East, particularly as the country recently set a precedent by attacking Israel in October 2024^liii. As such, it may be that Trump will empower Netanyahu to strike Iranian nuclear facilities if tensions continue in the long-term future. This would bring further hostility into the already unstable region, severely hindering Trump’s desire to be viewed as a peacemaker in the Middle East. Unless tensions reach new heights, it is likely that Trump would prefer to maintain the US’ image. Instead, given all these contributing factors, Trump may pursue a regime change in Iran instead. This would make it unlikely that the two countries could come together diplomatically, though Trump did seemingly rule this out during his campaign by stating he would “like to see Iran be very successful”^liv. In the long term, Trump may also revive strategies which include applying pressure on other countries to stop buying Iranian oil. This proved effective in his first presidency, as threats to China that the US would block access to its market were successful. This would contribute to the US’ dominating power over Middle Eastern states like Iran.  

Türkiye and NATO 

A crucial part of Trump’s presidency could be how he maintains US relations with Türkiye, and whether strained ties will be reset between the two countries. It is likely that Türkiye has looked favourably upon Trump’s win, with officials from the country looking positively towards the potential for new US economic policies. This would allow the country to strengthen its position as a bilateral and regional presence. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan congratulated Trump on his win and has invited the Republican to Türkiye^lv. Erdoğan’s invitation to Trump demonstrates how the country is reverting back to a leader-to-leader relationship, rather than the limitation of foreign minister communication which was observed during Biden’s presidency. 

However, should Trump take a staunch pro-Israel stance then relations between the countries could continue to decline further. This is possible given Trump’s support for Israel and the clash this has with Erdoğan’s backing of Hamas. On 27 November 2024, Erdoğan expressed Türkiye’s readiness to contribute to stop the ongoing conflict in Gaza and establish a lasting ceasefire. This is the first time the president mentioned Türkiye as part of the mediation efforts to end the ongoing conflict^lvi. Welcoming the ceasefire in Lebanon, Erdoğan’s statement demonstrates how Türkiye is strengthening its role in global politics by offering mediation efforts to resolve crises. This extends to the Russia-Ukraine war, which likely aligns with Trump’s belief that he could end the conflict in one day^lvii. Whilst it is unclear how Trump would achieve this; it is probable that the incoming president would oversee a deal between Russia and Ukraine. As Erdoğan has relationships with both Ukraine’s president Volodymyr Zelensky and Russia’s president Vladimir Putin, it may be that the efforts of Türkiye would aid the US in establishing a ceasefire deal between the two countries. 

Additionally, Trump’s relationship with Erdoğan and Türkiye’s foreign affairs minister Hakan Fidan could have a significant impact upon NATO’s footprint in the Middle East. On 25 November 2024, Secretary General Mark Rutte praised Türkiye for its commitment to the alliance’s collective security, particularly in relation to the fact that the country has the second-largest army in NATO after the US^lviii. In contrast, Trump has repeatedly criticised NATO and its European member states for spending too little on defence efforts, with the US providing a large proportion of funds. These criticisms and Trump’s plan to implement his America First policy could create some tension between the US and countries like Türkiye. This is because an increasingly isolated US could have a significant impact upon the operation of alliances like NATO. Whilst this may be a negotiating tactic from Trump to reduce the US’ financial commitment to the alliance, it will cause concern for NATO leaders. This is evident because the withdrawal of the US from NATO would signal the most significant shift in transatlantic defence relations in nearly a century^lix. This decision would contribute to the level of US influence and military reach in the Middle East, particularly when considering the Türkiye-based Incirlik Air Base. The Incirlik Air Base reportedly houses nuclear weapons maintained by the US, something which Trump seemingly confirmed in 2019^lx. The weapons are purportedly part of NATO’s deterrence strategy, meaning that their influence stretches beyond the US. If Trump was to pull the US out of NATO, then it would likely mean the military reach of the country would become limited in the Middle East. 

It is also likely that Türkiye will look to Trump’s incoming administration to change US relations with the PKK group. The PKK is currently fighting the Turkish state and reportedly has links to the YPG, a Syrian Kurdish militia. In Syria, the PKK reportedly occupies oil-rich regions with the US’ support. This has become a point of tension, though Turkish Foreign Minister Fidan has already stated that he believes “the Trump administration will review its relationship with the PKK. Because we convey to them at every opportunity how serious we are about this issue”^lxi. Relations between Türkiye and the Biden administration are currently strained because the US maintains its alliance with the group to fight against the Islamic State. Trump may be more likely to reduce the US’ ties with the PKK group in comparison to Biden, as the potential for this issue to turn from crises into conflict increases whilst the alliance remains. 

Conclusion 

Overall, it is clear that Trump’s election victory will mark a pivot in US relations with the Middle East. Since taking office in 2020, Joe Biden’s presidency has been viewed as mostly disastrous in the region, with the US’ influence and reputation declining. The consequence of this is that Joe Biden was viewed as a weak leader, often leading to raise geopolitical tensions with different countries in the region. As such, if the US election outcome was different and Kamala Harris had become president, then she would have subsequently been viewed as a weak leader too. This echoes the US citizens who voted in the election and were also unable to separate Harris from the current Biden administration. Over Biden’s tenure as president, regional players have not taken the US seriously. This is evidence by countries like China exploiting the US’ declining influence to create deals between Middle Eastern countries. Despite the recent announcement of a ceasefire deal between Israel and Hezbollah, Biden’s handling of the crises in the Middle East has contributed to the US’ waning regional power. 

As such, it is likely that Trump will take a different approach to the Middle East. This is not only related to the different conflicts in the region, but also other inconsistences which have been perpetuated by the current US government. Nevertheless, Trump will have to compete with an emboldened China, which has gained diplomatic capital in the Middle East. Countries like Iran, which are more likely to face scrutiny from the US, are relying on the economic leverage which China brings. This is evidenced by trade deals, such as the one signed in 2021 by China and Iran which is worth up to $400 billion of Chinese investment over 25 years in exchange for the supply of Iranian oil^lxii. This provided some financial relief to Iran as it faced international sanctions. Because of deals like this, the US will have to win back the trust and cooperation of Middle Eastern countries. 

Additionally, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Türkiye have made inroads into BRICS, an intergovernmental organisation and geopolitical bloc which coordinates multilateral policies. The growing influence of BRICS is something which Trump will have to combat, as he will need to incentivise partners back into the US’ ecosystem. It may be that the incoming president does this in a transactional manner, leaning on tactics which have brought him success previously. The president elect has already threatened to impose tariffs on BRICS if it moves away from the dollar, as countries such as Brazil and Russia suggested a Brics currency would reduce the dominance of the US dollar in global trade^lxiii. This is likely important early political leverage for Trump, demonstrating his willingness to use the US economy as a threat of economic pressure for other countries. Since the start of Biden’s presidency, Middle Eastern states have kept ties with the US open but have also started to be openly courted by other countries, including China and Russia. This demonstrates how the Middle East is looking to diversify its partners, something that Trump will be highly aware of. However, this does mean that any deals conducted will no longer just be privy to the US, with increased levels of competition being posed by vendors from other countries. It may also be that this competition comes domestically unless Trump is able to quickly rectify Middle Eastern trust in the US. 

Consequently, it is likely that Trump will be more respected than Biden as he takes office in January 2025. However, there is no doubt that the Middle East is a changed region from when Trump was first in office. For example, the region is investing in its technology sector by funding and supporting a variety of new digital schemes. This can be seen, for instance, in Saudi Arabia’s information and communications technology sector, which was valued at $40.9 billion and accounted for 4.1% of its GDP in 2023^lxiv. This is a key change which encourages efficiency in the region, something which is bolstered by additional support from countries such as China and Russia that are promoting growth and development. As such, the US will have to fight hard for its influence to have the same impact that it once did. To achieve this, Trump may have to implement a similar approach of providing additional support to the Middle East’s independence instead of posing the US as a dominating presence. This may become a priority for Trump as he returns to office, though whether this brings further long-term instability in the US’ relations with the Middle East remains to be observed. 

Endnotes

i. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/live/czxrnw5qrprt – BBC News, 6 November 2024.  

ii. https://news.sky.com/story/republicans-make-gains-as-they-take-control-of-senate-for-first-time-in-four-years-13249210 – Sky News, 6 November 2024.

iii. https://apnews.com/article/republicans-house-elections-e3754a684a7b96b129841d4b207c15e9 – StephenGroves and Lisa Mascaro, Associated Press, 14 November 2024.

iv. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/11/6/what-does-trump-2-0-mean-for-us-foreign-policy – Jillian Kestler-D’Armours, Al Jazeera, 6 November 2024.

v. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-42259443 – BBC News, 6 December 2017.

vi. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/08/world/middleeast/trump-iran-nuclear-deal.html – Mark Landler, NY Times, 8 May 2018.

vii. https://www.latimes.com/politics/story/2020-09-15/trump-israel-united-arab-emirates-bahrain-signing-ceremony Tracy Wilkinson and Noga Tarnopolsky, LA Times, 15 September 2020.

viii. https://www.latimes.com/world-nation/story/2024-11-21/a-much-changed-middle-east-prepares-for-trump-2-0 – Nabih Bulos, LA Times, 21 November 2024.

ix. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cev90d7wkk0o – James Fitzgerald, BBC News, 6 November 2024.

x. https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/2024-election/trump-netanyahu-biden-rcna120078 – Katherine Doyle, NBC News, 13 October 2023.

xi. https://www.cbsnews.com/video/long-term-effects-trump-plans-more-us-drilling/ – CBS News, 18 November 2024. 

xii. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/c93qjdjwnxko – Ido Vock, BBC News, 17 November 2024.

xiii. https://www.spglobal.com/commodityinsights/en/market-insights/latest-news/oil/111724-trumps-oil-and-gas-friendly-energy-secretary-pick-seen-as-fantastic-in-middle-east – Lauren Holtmeier, Herman Wang, S&P Global, 17 November 2024.

xiv. https://www.spglobal.com/commodityinsights/en/market-insights/latest-news/oil/111724-trumps-oil-and-gas-friendly-energy-secretary-pick-seen-as-fantastic-in-middle-east – Lauren Holtmeier, Herman Wang, S&P Global, 17 November 2024.

xv. https://www.aa.com.tr/en/economy/oil-prices-rise-on-us-demand-surge-weaker-dollar-mideast-cease-fire/3405858 – Zeynep Beyza Kilic, AA, 27 November 2024. 

xvi.  See above.

xvii. https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/oil-falls-potential-deal-end-israel-hezbollah-conflict-2024-11-26/ – Georgina Mccartney, Reuters, 26 November 2024.

xviii. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cly2exvx944o – David Gritten, BBC News, 21 November 2024.

xix. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/8/1/israel-says-hamas-military-leader-mohammed-deif-killed-in-july – Al Jazeera, 1 August 2024.

xx. https://www.theguardian.com/world/video/2024/nov/21/netanyahu-calls-icc-arrest-warrant-antisemitic-video– The Guardian.

xxi. https://www.investing.com/economic-calendar/api-weekly-crude-stock-656 – US API weekly crude oil stock, investing.com, 26 November 2024.

xxii. https://www.theguardian.com/law/video/2024/nov/21/us-rejects-icc-arrest-warrants-for-netanyahu-gallant-and-hamas-commander-video – The Guardian.

xxiii. https://www.icc-cpi.int/palestine – ICC, 3 March 2021.

xxiv. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/6/5/us-house-seeks-to-sanction-icc-for-accusing-israel-of-gaza-war-crimes – Al Jazeera, 5 June 2024.

xxv. https://www.state.gov/ending-sanctions-and-visa-restrictions-against-personnel-of-the-international-criminal-court/ – Antony J. Blinken, US Department of Justice, 2 April 2021.

xxvi. https://www.foxnews.com/video/6362939090112 – 7 October 2024.

xxvii. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/11/13/israel-trump-netanyahu-lebanon-ceasefire-kushner/ – Shira Rubin, Suzan Haidamous, and John Hudson, The Washington Post, 13 November 2024.

xxviii. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/c75lpzq0re1o – Frank Gardner, Frances Mao, BBC News, 26 November 2024.

xxix. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/c6273139ed4o – Jaroslav Lukiv, David Gritten, BBC News, 3 December 2024.

xxx. https://www.aa.com.tr/en/americas/cease-fire-deal-between-israel-and-hezbollah-takes-effect/3405757 – Burak Dag, AA, 27 November 2024.

xxxi. https://edition.cnn.com/2024/11/19/middleeast/israel-arrest-warrants-ultra-orthodox-draft-intl-latam/index.html – Tamar Michaelis, CNN, 19 November 2024.

xxxii. https://apnews.com/article/biden-trump-israel-hezbollah-ceasefire-lebanon-c377aa342396d5fff0f3adc996a2225f – Aamer Madhani, AP News, 27 November 2024.

xxxiii. https://apnews.com/article/trump-threat-hostages-israel-gaza-1aa9af22c070ab8ee0d8baf97bb05df8 – Jill Colvin, AP News, 2 December 2024.

xxxiv. https://www.cbsnews.com/news/will-israel-annex-west-bank-after-trump-takes-office/ – Haley Ott, CBS News, 19 November 2024.

xxxv. https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/the-expansion-of-israeli-settlements-in-the-west-bank-is-wholly-unacceptable-and-illegal-uk-statement-at-the-un-security-council – UK FCDO, 19 September 2024.

xxxvi. https://time.com/7176436/mike-huckabee-trump-israel-ambassador-palestinians-middle-east/ – Adriana Gomez Licon, Time, 13 November 2024.

xxxvii. https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20241120-trump-opposes-israel-annexation-of-west-bank-republican-sources-say/ – Middle East Monitor, 20 November 2024.

xxxviii. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-67422238 – Anthony Zurcher, 15 November 2023.

xxxix. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=w8jp-38TSVI&t=18s – Al Arabiya English, 20 October 2024.

xl. https://www.britannica.com/topic/Abraham-Accords – Adam Zeidan, 30 September 2024.

xli. https://www.ft.com/content/8f89fd03-d53c-4e06-9531-2048b8a862b5 – Andrew England, The Financial Times, 20 November 2024. 

xlii. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-43724576 – BBC News, 11 April 2018.

xliii. https://www.state.gov/joint-statement-of-the-united-states-egypt-and-qatar/ – US Department of Justice, 1 June 2024.

xliv. https://edition.cnn.com/2024/01/02/politics/us-qatar-agreement-largest-base-middle-east/index.html – Alex Marquardt, Natasha Bertrand, CNN, 2 January 2024.

xlv. https://www.nytimes.com/2024/11/21/us/politics/pam-bondi-trump-ag-lobbyist.html – Kenneth P. Vogel, NY Times, 21 November 2024.

xlvi. https://edition.cnn.com/2024/10/22/middleeast/washingtons-arab-allies-engage-with-iran-intl/index.html – Mostafa Salem, CNN, 23 October 2024.

xlvii. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/3/11/changing-global-order-china-restores-ties-with-iran-and-saudi – Mersiha Gadzo, Al Jazeera, 11 March 2023.

xlviii. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-50979463 – BBC News, 3 January 2020.

xlix. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/08/world/middleeast/trump-iran-nuclear-deal.html – Mark Landler, NY Times, 8 May 2018.

l. https://www.politico.com/news/2024/09/26/trump-iran-nyc-press-conference-00181367 – Kierra Frazier, 26 September 2024. 

li. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/nov/20/iran-has-offered-to-keep-uranium-below-purity-levels-for-a-bomb-iaea-confirms – Patrick Wintour, The Guardian, 20 November 2024.

lii. https://www.politico.com/news/2024/09/26/trump-campaign-hack-iran-indictment-00181321 – Betsy Woodruff Swan, Josh Gerstein, Politico, 26 September 2024.

liii. https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-10113/ – UK House of Commons, 5 November 2024.

liv. https://apnews.com/article/biden-trump-israel-hezbollah-ceasefire-lebanon-c377aa342396d5fff0f3adc996a2225f – Aamer Madhani, AP, 27 November 2024.

lv. https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/eying-reset-ties-erdogan-invites-trump-visit-turkey-2024-11-08/ – Huseyin Hayatsever and Tuvan Gumrukcu, Reuters, 8 November 2024.

lvi. https://www.aa.com.tr/en/turkiye/turkiye-ready-to-contribute-to-stop-massacre-in-gaza-establish-cease-fire-president/3406205 – Serdar Dincel, AA, 27 November 2024. 

lvii. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jcNzoONhrmE – Channel 4 News, YouTube, 5 March 2023.

lviii. https://www.reuters.com/article/world/factbox-turkeys-armed-forces-idUSTRE79I5G2 – Reuters, 19 October 2011.

lix. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/c2dl0e4l7lzo – Tom Bateman, BBC News, 6 November 2024.

lx. https://edition.cnn.com/2019/10/16/politics/trump-us-nuclear-weapons-turkey/index.html – Zachary Cohen, CNN, 16 October 2019. 

lxi. https://www.aa.com.tr/en/americas/trump-administration-to-review-its-relationship-with-pkk-terror-group-turkish-foreign-minister/3402339 – Tugba Altun, AA, 23 November 2024.

lxii. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/1/15/iran-says-25-year-china-agreement-enters-implementation-stage– Maziar Motamedi, Al Jazeera, 15 January 2022.

lxiii. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cgrwj0p2dd9o – Holly Honderich, BBC News, 1 December 2024. 

lxiv. https://www.trade.gov/country-commercial-guides/saudi-arabia-digital-economy-0 – International Trade Administration, 19 September 2024.